Training for Morality

Training for Morality

By Martin L. Cowen III

This essay discloses the object of moral training. We are several steps into new moral territory. We are excited about it.

Larry Woods (a member and Trustee of the Fellowship of Reason) keeps us on our intellectual toes. Larry drives our effort to discover new moral paths. He urges caution as we take new ones. Thank you, Larry.

We read Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics as translated by Joe Sachs. Professor Sachs taught us that a century of attempts to understand Aristotle’s ethics were hobbled by a mistranslation of the ancient Greek phrase, to kalon. The popular modern translation is “the noble.” More accurately, according to Professor Sachs, the meaning of the Greek phrase is “the beautiful” in an expression such as this: the virtuous person acts “for the sake of the beautiful, for this is the end of virtue.” (1115B, 12-13) Aristotle intends to teach us that all ethical action aims at “the beautiful.” Ethical actions flow from virtue. Virtue is a character trait of the excellent man. Aristotle’s virtues are not mysterious: courage, temperance, generosity, magnificence, magnanimity, appetite for honor, gentleness, truthfulness, friendliness, and justice. “The beautiful” is not mysterious. It means that same thing that we mean when we say, “She is a beautiful woman.” Simple. Aristotle says that the goal of morality is the beautiful. That we all recognize some relationship between beauty and morality is illustrated by expressions like “That was a beautiful thing you did” or “Don’t be ugly.”

Larry Woods cautioned us by asking, “Well, isn’t beauty in the eye of the beholder?

Larry is concerned, as are we all, that morality ought not be subjective or arbitrary. The complete moral relativists might say, “If another thinks that murder is a beautiful thing, who am I to insist otherwise.” Or, “One person’s freedom fighter is another person’s terrorist.”

Thus, ended our first level of inquiry.

Next, we learned that “beauty is a perception.” By this, we mean that when we see a beautiful object, we do not analyze the object, ponder the analysis, and then conclude that the object is beautiful. Rather we see a beautiful sunset and it strikes us as beautiful. We hear a beautiful song and it strikes us as beautiful. We smell a beautiful aroma and its strikes us as beautiful. We taste a beautiful flavor and its strikes us as beautiful. We feel and delightful cloth and it strikes us as beautiful.

We learned that each of us has experience and training in different areas and that we can perceive the beautiful in areas in which we are experienced or expert.

We concluded that training is crucial to the perception of the beautiful.

Larry Woods cautions us by asserting: “We beg the question—“Isn’t the judgment of beauty subjective?”—by replacing that question with the assertion that “proper training is necessary for the perception of beauty.” Larry says that we replaced the first question about beauty with an assertion about “proper” training, replacing the question about “beauty” with an implicit question about “proper.”

So that is where we are today in this essay. We want to answer Larry Woods’ newest cautionary comment by answering the question, “Is the choice of training subjective or arbitrary?”

Let us first think about training in general. There are hundreds, perhaps thousands, of things for which human beings are trained. Here is a short list.

Piano	French	Doctor
Violin	Latin	Lawyer
Guitar	Greek	Pharmacy
French horn	Spanish	Teaching
Oboe	Mathematics	Football
Harp	Physics	Basketball
Ballet	Chemistry	Soccer
Acting	Biology	Golf
Voice	Business administration	Tennis
Gymnastics	Truck driving	Scuba diving

This short list can be expanded simply by listing, for example, more languages, more careers, or more specialties within categories. “Doctor,” for example, does not clarify M.D., D.D.S, Ph.D., etc. or the dozens of subspecialties within those designations.

The point to be acknowledged now is that we have no anxiety about what “proper” training means in any of these fields. The method for training a good lawyer is agreed upon and is virtually the same in dozens of law schools across the United States.

A well trained lawyer can recognize a beautiful brief by virtue of his training. A well trained pianist can recognize a beautiful recital by virtue of her training. A well trained golfer can recognize a beautiful round by virtue of her training as can the rest of us the least bit familiar with golf by virtue of the golfer’s score in that round. About these claims, there is no dispute.

While the recognition of the beautiful in a particular field by a person experienced or expert in the field is a perception, the expert can explain why the thing is beautiful. The explanation, though, will not render the thing beautiful to the inexperienced. A thing is perceived to be beautiful or it is not so perceived. One cannot be “persuaded” into the “experience” of beauty. One “has” the experience of beauty, if one is trained and in the presence of the beautiful.

What is “proper” training for a lawyer is agreed upon and is not arbitrary or subjective. The extreme cynic might say, though: “Who is to say that a lawyer who does not know the law, cannot write a brief, cannot argue a case to a jury, and does not know how to fill out government forms is not a ‘real’ or ‘proper’ lawyer?” How do we answer such a question? The answer is that it is a matter of definition.

A lawyer is defined as a person who knows the law, can write a brief, can argue a case to a jury, and knows how to fill out government forms. If she cannot do these things, she is not a lawyer. Therefore, the “proper” training of a lawyer must result in the creation of a lawyer. That is what “proper” training means. The training in question results in the creation of the object of the training.

Training is not subjective or arbitrary. “Proper” training results in the creation of the object of the training.

We like to separate ethical action into action involving others and action involving ourselves. If ethical action means simply the answer to the question—“What ought I do in this circumstance?”—it seems that ethical action can be action involving only ourselves. For example: “Ought I eat this piece of cake or rather this nice, crisp Fuji apple?” Or, more importantly: “Ought I choose a career doing something I love (e.g. acting), or doing something I like much less (e.g. selling vacuum cleaners) for more money?” One might argue that the more beautiful thing to do is to be, for a while, the starving young artist, auditioning by day and waitressing by night. These, too, are ethical questions.

Larry Woods is more interested in fundamental ethical choices like “selfishness v. self-sacrifice” as the choice pertains to other people and yourself.

Before we go there, let us hammer down the point that enormous domains of human action have objective and widely agreed upon training regimes. Methods of training for lawyering, doctoring, truck driving, what have you, are widely agreed upon.

If we apply what we have learned about training in general to the question at hand, we should ask: “What is the object of moral training?”

Morality provides the answer to the question: “What ought I do?” The object, therefore, of moral training is to create an individual who can excellently answer the question: “What ought I do?” This question, in turn, points to another question: “To what end does the individual act, in the broadest sense?” The ultimate choice is life or death. Ought one act to live or die? The question is easy. If one chooses to die, then he commits suicide and all questions are answered. If one chooses to live, then that choice provides a standard by which to judge various answers in various contexts to the moral question, “What ought I do in order to live?” “Live” in this context means “live well.” The alternative, “live badly” leads in the extreme case to die. “Live well” means to flourish as a human being. Readers of this newsletter will be familiar with this concept because members of the Fellowship of Reason call themselves eudaimonists. We are Eudaimonists. Eudaimonism, derived from the Greek word “eudaimonia,” means “well-being-ism.”

The moralist, therefore, must look to human nature to determine what for a human being is “living well.” A model for this activity is found in determining what it means for a rose (the flower) to live well or flourish. A flourishing rose is large, robust, well formed with a strong stem, sharp thorns, and verdant leaves in the midst of a sunny, moist country garden. (Such a rose is beautiful.) In contrast, a rose that is not living well or flourishing is one found in the crack of a sidewalk in August on Fifth Avenue at 49^th Street in New York City, one inch high with few petals, no thorns, and no leaves, desiccated.

Following the rose model, a flourishing human being is, physically, a healthy, well-fed, well-formed individual. Unlike a rose, human beings have a mental faculty. A flourishing human being is, mentally, happy.

We all know, therefore, what a flourishing human being looks like. (Such an individual is beautiful.)

The moralist must then ask, “How does a flourishing human being come into existence?” How does a beautiful human being who performs beautiful actions come into existence?

The moralist looks to history, psychology, anthropology, and economics for an answers to these questions.

I recently finished reading A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous 14^th Century (1987), by Barbara Tuckman. As an illustration of what not to do to create beautiful people in beautiful human environments, a better example is not to be found. Human population reached a Middle Ages low point shortly after this period as the result of famine, plague, rape, pillage, and war. This period is part of the Hundred Year’s War. A prominent feature of this time was groups of armed men who roamed Europe killing and looting peasants and anyone else who could not defend themselves.

It is not possible in the remaining few paragraphs of this essay to survey history, psychology, anthropology, and economics for further guideposts. The method is established. The moralist will conclude from a thorough survey that a dominant feature of periods during which human beings have flourished is HUMAN FREEDOM. These periods include Ancient Greece during the 5^th century, Rome during the period of the Good Emperors, the Italian Renaissance, the Industrial Revolution in England, and the Nineteenth Century in Europe and America. Freedom means the protection of property rights under the rule of law.

            The beautiful human circumstance is freedom. The individual in the circumstance of freedom is allowed by the social circumstances (government and cultural) to do his work, to trade his product in voluntary transactions with others, and to keep the products of his work and trade.

The goal of moral training then is the human being trained for liberty. This is the meaning of a liberal education. Such training produces ladies and gentlemen. Ladies and gentlemen are human beings trained in and, therefore, suited for freedom. (Recall  and compare the flourishing rose in the country garden.)

To summarized, we have asserted that the goal of moral action is the beautiful. We have asserted that the beautiful is in the eye of the beholder. We have asserted that beauty is perceived. Beauty is perceived by a person well trained in the domain in which the beautiful action or thing exists. “Proper” training results in the creation of the object of the training. The object of legal training is a lawyer. The object of musical training is a musician. The object of moral training is a human being who can answer the question, “How ought I live well.” Living well is determined by an examination of history, psychology, anthropology, and economics. That examination shows that human beings flourish under freedom. Freedom is the protection of property rights under the rule of law. The object of moral training is to create ladies and gentlemen, individuals suited for liberty.

Ladies and gentlemen can recognize beautiful human action by virtue of their training.